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Lessons from a fall
Frank Boyd, acting chair of IWU's political science
department, addressed the issue of U.S. policy in Latin
American in the op-ed column "Questions and Conclusions,"
a regular feature of IWU Magazine.
When President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of Bolivia
visited Illinois Wesleyan in September, he joked that many of
his political opponents back home would be happy if he
decided to take a permanent vacation in the United States.
While intended as a humorous aside, those words turned out
to be prophetic. After dozens of civilian deaths and weeks of
violent clashes between protestors and the police, Sánchez de
Lozada resigned in October and flew to the United States. His
resignation and the installation of a new government has
important implications for Bolivia, to be sure, but his political
demise signals something broader for United States’ policy
toward Latin America.
Sánchez de Lozada was praised around the world for the farreaching reforms of his first presidential term (1993-97). He
was the first South American president to mandate the
teaching of indigenous languages in primary schools, and
under his plan of “Popular Participation,” local elected
officials were given more control of government revenues.

What happened in Bolivia has
long-term implications for
American foreign policy, says
Associate Professor Frank Boyd
(shown above).

One of his most innovative initiatives was the “capitalization” of state-owned industries. Bolivia
is among several developing nations that have tried privatization of these bloated industries as a
way to increase revenue and to expose those industries to the discipline of a free market. Sánchez
de Lozada recognized that privatization’s benefits often did not reach the citizenry, but instead
were misappropriated by central government officials and well-connected political elites. In his
“capitalization” plan, private industries were given shares in state-owned industries in exchange
for capital investment and contributions to Bonasol, the first universal social security system in
South America.
When Sánchez de Lozada began a second term as president in 2002, Bolivia’s economy had been
severely damaged by the global economic downturn that began in the late 1990s. The poorest
Bolivians suffered even more as a result of a U.S.-sponsored policy to eradicate coca leaves, the
raw material for cocaine, as part of its ongoing war on drugs. This policy eliminated the meager
but essential livelihood of scores of indigenous citizens. (Coca production is legal in Bolivia and
many peasants chew the leaves during the workday while middle-class Bolivians often drink
mates de coca, sold in nearly every café.)
In exchange for eradicating coca, the U.S. provided Bolivia with incentives to encourage
alternative economic development. This policy failed, due primarily to insufficient funding but

also because the alternative products it encouraged Bolivia to develop faced protected markets in
both the United States and Europe.
Sánchez de Lozada received less than 25 percent of the vote in last year’s election and was able
to cobble together a fragile coalition, but it became clear he had lost support from most of the
county’s poor. Many of them instead followed the charismatic populist Evo Morales, who had
successfully identified Sánchez de Lozada with the Spanish-descended, elite minority that most
citizens felt was responsible for Bolivia’s economic and social ills.
A plan to export Bolivia’s vast natural gas reserves to Mexico and the U.S. through a Chilean
seaport sparked the October riots and Sánchez de Lozada’s ouster. Poor Bolivians saw this plan
as another attempt by the elite to gain wealth by exploiting the country’s precious natural
resources, as they had in previous exports of silver and tin. Thousands of demonstrators cheered
at the announcement of Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation, but it was unclear how the country’s
new leader, former vice president Carlos Mesa, would have any more success in meeting their
overall demands.
What happened in Bolivia has two clear implications for U.S. foreign policy. First, the United
States must think clearly about the long-term implications of imposing the costs for our national
drug problem on the so-called producer countries of South America. The aggressive campaign to
eradicate cocaine production in Colombia, where drugs have nearly destroyed a once-stable
democracy, has pushed the production of cocaine and accompanying political instability into
Peru and, very recently, Bolivia. Without a concomitant commitment to provide feasible
alternative economic opportunities for the producers, the United States’ policy does not
significantly diminish cocaine exports to the U.S., but instead creates a mobilized political class
in the Andes that threatens constitutional democracy.
Second, the instability in Bolivia and the other Andean countries obviates the need for a more
coherent foreign policy in our hemisphere. During his recent visit to Illinois Wesleyan, Sánchez
de Lozada spoke at length about the disappointment shared by leaders in the Americas over the
not-so-benign neglect of U.S. foreign policy. Several weeks later, in the days after Sánchez de
Lozada’s resignation, Illinois Congressman Ray LaHood joined others in noting that the U.S. had
“missed an opportunity in Bolivia.” But, with pressing commitments in other parts of the world,
the Bush administration has shown little interest in the region and committed very few resources,
either diplomatic or economic.
Unfortunately, many analysts and regional leaders worry that unless the United States plays a
more active role in these crises, a more general, Andean-wide, instability could result. That
scenario would serve neither the interests of the U.S. nor our neighbors to the South.

